David Biette, the director of the Canada Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC, sees Canada adrift in matters of foreign policy. In reviewing two books on Canadian international policy, Mr. Biette also makes his own case for how Canada should behave on this continent and in the world. Over many years of Liberal government in the post–Cold War era, he says, Canada’s “foreign policy drifted, presumably guided by superior Canadian ‘values’ and, clearly in many cases, by public opinion.”
Mr. Biette’s use of scarequotes in describing Canadian values is presumably meant to communicate his skepticism that Canadian values actually exist and, if they do, that they might form a meaningful basis for a Canadian foreign policy that differs from that of the United States. As for public opinion, those who view it as a credible basis on which to construct policy in a democracy should be warned: international policy under the Liberals was not guided merely by public opinion, but by the “whims of public opinion” [italics mine], which are sometimes just “an emotional reaction to whatever George W. Bush does.” (How embarrassing for Canada to be the only country in which emotiondriven opinion can influence government policy.)
When polls find a lack of enthusiasm among Canadians for some elements of American foreign policy, we are not to understand that Canada is a nation unto itself, whose citizens have their own ideas about how to engage with the world. Instead, we are to understand that Canadians are merely being contrary. “By being different for the sake of being different,” Biette warns, “Canada has let itself become irrelevant in Washington.”
I find it intriguing that Canadian skepticism about the war on terror is read by some as whimsy or childish contrarianism, instead of a serious position that is shared by much of the world, and indeed many Americans. Why this unwillingness to believe that Canadian public opinion might be an important consideration, not least to the Canadian government?
There is no reason to doubt that Jean Chrétien refused to join the coalition of the willing in 2003 for serious reasons: that he did not believe there was sufficient evidence for the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and that he doubted there was any meaningful link between the horror of September 11 and the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein. To most, his decision has proven not petulant, but prescient. In June 2003, a strong majority (69 percent) of Canadians supported their government’s decision not to participate in the Iraq war; a year later, the proportion of Canadians supporting Chrétien’s decision had climbed to 82 percent. In America, incidentally, a June 2006 Los Angeles Times poll found 54 percent saying “the situation in Iraq” was “not worth going to war over.” Also in June 2006, the Pew Center found American opinion nearly split on whether the Iraq war had helped (44 percent) or hurt (40 percent) America’s cause in the war on terror. In view of the legitimate concerns surrounding America’s reasons for going to war in Iraq, to suggest that Canadian policy visàvis the United States during this period was a matter of mere nosethumbing is insulting.
As valiant as our grandfathers were at Vimy Ridge, Chrétien’s decision must stand alongside their valorous achievement as another occasion when Canada proved it was a nation—and that values, even Canadian values, are real and matter in foreign policy. That Chrétien’s decision was backed by public opinion then, and even more so now, suggests a course for Canada that is the exact opposite of Mr. Biette’s advice that “Canadian foreign policy needs … strong leadership from the top.” On the contrary: Canada needs a foreign policy directed by its own values and interests, not always the same as those of the superpower to the south. It also needs policies acceptable to its people—not directed by “strong leadership” that runs counter to what Canadians believe to be right. Canada must be directed from below, not from above, as in any democracy.
Finally, there is the question of realism. Those who disagree with the United States are often accused of being unrealistic in one way or another (naiveté is an especially common problem, it seems). If Mr. Biette or others in Washington believe Canadians’ ideas about Canada’s military capabilities, political influence and the state of the world are misguided, a good first step would be to make a sound case for why Canadians should change their thinking—not to dismiss, and urge our leaders to dismiss, Canadian public opinion as ignorant contrarianism.
Michael Adams
Toronto, Ontario
