When Sir Charles Tupper arrived in London in 1883, this Nova Scotia–born father of Confederation must have known that his new responsibilities as high commissioner would be wide-ranging. Barely a decade after Ottawa decided to establish permanent representation in the United Kingdom, the high commission remained a small and modest operation. Employees, not least the high commissioner himself, had to be resourceful jacks-of-all-trades, always ready to provide assistance to Canadian businessmen or government officials in order to help them overcome the sundry problems they encountered in the mother country.
Sir Charles, however, was an especially creative problem fixer, one who never shrank from a challenge. One story is especially revealing of his character. In those days, the UK was an important market for Canadian foodstuffs, but cumber-some regulations often stood in the way of greater exports. When, one morning, Tupper’s office was informed that cunning British officials in Liverpool had once again tried to condemn a full consignment of Canadian cattle on dubious health grounds, he sprang into action.
While an aide got him a train ticket, Tupper ran to the nearest medical shop to buy books and surgery tools. A doctor by trade, he was not an expert on pleuro-pneumonia, the disease apparently affecting the Canadian cattle, but the books just acquired were going to teach him all he needed to know on his way to Liverpool. Upon arriving at his destination, he quickly proceeded to the cattle yards and was soon pestering officials with detailed questions. Finding their explanations lacking, Sir Charles rolled up his sleeves and began dissecting one “sick” cow after another, eventually demonstrating that the Canadian consignment had been healthy enough. Dumbfounded British officials had learned their lesson, at least for a while: don’t mess with Canadian cattle imports, unless you are ready to deal with “that old devil from London.”
Since the days of Tupper, the responsibilities of our high commissioners have changed tremendously. While speaking at public fairs to promote immigration was a key task in the 19th century, a high commissioner serving in the immediate aftermath of World War II was more likely to find himself travelling to Geneva or Paris to attend international conferences and shape emerging new institutions such as the United Nations or NATO. As the number and diversity of tasks grew, Ottawa was also forced to send more and more officials to serve in London. While Tupper had to make do with a handful of subordinates, George Drew, who served as high commissioner between 1957 and 1964, found himself at the apex of a bureaucracy representing more than a dozen federal departments and hundreds of officers. By then, needless to say, dissecting cattle was no longer part of the job description.
It would be difficult to find someone more qualified than Roy MacLaren to tell the story of Canada House, the name by which our high commission in London has been known since 1925. He began his professional career with the Canadian foreign service in the late 1950s, and spent much of the following twelve years on postings at the UN, Prague, Hanoi and Saigon. After entering politics in 1979, he went on to serve as minister for national revenue in John Turner’s Cabinet and minister for international trade in the first years of Jean Chrétien’s government. He was then appointed high commissioner to the UK in 1996, where he remained for four years. This dual experience, at both ends of the diplomatic spectrum, i.e., as a bureaucrat and as a politician, gave him a unique understanding of how foreign policy is made and implemented.
MacLaren’s narrative is thorough. It starts in 1869, with the appointment of John Rose as Canada’s first de facto, if not yet de jure, high commissioner, and ends just over a century later, in 1971, with the completion of British negotiations to join the European Economic Community. What unfolds in between is the fascinating tale of a nation struggling to find its rightful place in the world.
Upon landing in the UK in 1869 as Canada’s first official representative, John Rose faced a number of challenging tasks, one of which was to bring a semblance of order to Canada’s informal network of agents. For years, a small number of non-diplomatic personnel, scattered all over the UK and Europe, representing different provinces and, after Confederation, different federal departments as well, had worked with little or no coordination amongst themselves, often promoting different and contradictory policies. The problem was that Rose had been given few tools with which to act. He certainly could not rely on the prestige of his diplomatic status: he had none. According to the order-in-council that appointed him, Rose was simply “a Gentleman possessing the confidence of the Canadian Government with whom Her Majesty’s Government may properly communicate on Canadian affairs.” The vagueness of his title, to say nothing of that of his mandate, reflected the fact that Ottawa had been of two minds about his appointment. Many realized that only an official government representative could efficiently defend and promote the interests of a rapidly expanding nation, but others feared this appointment amounted to a first step toward independence from the British Empire.
Yet, during the eleven years he spent in London, Rose unambiguously demonstrated the importance for the Canadian government to have an official and permanent representative in the world’s most important capital. A lawyer and banker by trade, Rose had also served as finance minister under John A. Macdonald and thus knew better than most how to play the financial markets of London. This was no small asset. In the early days of Confederation, much of a high commissioner’s work involved directly negotiating favourable terms for important infra-structure projects such as a trans-Pacific cable, a trans-Atlantic steamship service or one of the many railways being built in Canada, not least the Canadian Pacific Railway—railroad financing would in fact be a source of problems for Rose and his successors right up to World War I.
On the policy front, there was one issue that virtually all high commissioners in MacLaren’s book had to face in one form or another: imperial tariff preference. In a nutshell, this was a policy that called for discrimination between imperial and non-imperial goods. Were it to be adopted, tariffs applied on trade between the UK and its colonies would be lower than those imposed on exchanges between Britain and, say, the United States.
From today’s standpoint this sounds harmless enough, but in those days it was highly controversial stuff. Over the years, much energy was expended and many a temper lost, arguing about its pros and cons. What is interesting about the debate, however, is how arguments brought forward by both sides changed, often in very significant ways, as Britain’s place in the world evolved and its relationship with Canada and other colonies matured.
In the last decades of the 19th century, Canada was generally in favour of imperial tariff preference as long as a certain amount of protection was accorded to its nascent industrial base, which, it was feared, could hardly compete with more sophisticated British manufacturers. Proponents at home also hoped that tariff preference would bind the Empire more tightly together and so minimize risks of annexation by the United States. For early high commissioners such as Alexander Galt, who served in London between 1880 and 1883, promoting this policy was thus high on the agenda.
Britain, however, was much less receptive. In those days, free trade theory dominated economic think-ing and raising tariffs was unpopular with the business elite, not to mention Gladstone’s Liberals, who held power for long periods of time during the second half of the 19th century. Furthermore, the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 had extended voting rights to much of the working class and, since then, raising tariffs had also become politically difficult. Favouring imports from Canada and other colonies, which mostly consisted of foodstuffs, meant that duties would have to be levied on imports from other regions. As a result, prices for agricultural goods would tend to go up, something the poor would be sure to oppose at the ballot box. As if that were not enough, many across Britain were becoming more vocal about the financial burden imposed by the colonies and would have been only too happy to bid them good riddance.
By the beginning of the 20th century, however, the debate had completely changed. Gone was Albion’s indifference to its colonies. Its confidence shaken by the Boer War, Britain also cast an increasingly wary eye toward Germany, whose navy, in the run-up to World War I, was expanding at an alarming rate. All this made London more receptive to proposals aimed at strengthening imperial ties. By then, however, Ottawa had become somewhat ambivalent, fearing that closer economic relations would force Canada into a more serious commitment for imperial defence, something which most Canadian prime ministers would oppose, often forcefully. This explains why on several occasions Sir Wilfrid Laurier had to caution his high commissioner, Lord Strathcona, who served for a record 18 years after 1896, to keep his imperial enthusiasm in check.
The debate would never be resolved. Time and again negotiations were launched, often at one of the many imperial conferences held between 1887 and 1937, but Ottawa’s insistence that our industries be afforded some protection, its reluctance to seriously commit resources to defend the Empire and, as important, London’s refusal to give the colonies a say in policy making, meant that imperial tariff preference would remain just a good idea. It was revived briefly after World War II under a different form, i.e., that of a Commonwealth free trade zone, but by then the UK had come to realize, to the chagrin of Diefenbaker and his high commissioner, George Drew, that post-war economic salvation lay within Europe, not the Commonwealth.
By virtue of their access to the most powerful politicians on both sides of the Atlantic, high commissioners were in a position to have a direct impact on relations with Great Britain. Whether they could make full use of this influence, however, is another question that very much depended on the nature of their relationship with whoever happened to be prime minister in Ottawa. Both often had strong views on what should be Canada’s place in the Empire or the wider world and these often led to disagreements. While domestic politics were a key consideration for the prime minister, the high commissioner, being far from home but at the very centre of the diplomatic world, usually developed a more global perspective. This inevitably created ten-sions, which were resolved more or less constructively depending on how the two related to each other on a personal level. This, in turn, directly affected Canada’s position on key foreign policy questions.
This is perhaps the most important theme coming out of MacLaren’s narrative. Although never explicitly put forward as a thesis, he shows how the dynamics between the prime minister and the high commissioner is crucial to help explain why Canada seized or missed opportunities. When a strong prime minister chose a pliant and submissive high commissioner, as Mackenzie King did in 1922 when he sent Peter Larkin to London, the results could seriously prejudice Canadian interests. In this case, Larkin knew the prime minister did not want policy advice and so he offered little—instead, they exchanged gossip about butlers and maids. He was also well aware of King’s obsessive fear of British centralizing tendencies, real or imagined, and thus was always cautious when approaching British authorities, even for the simple purpose of gathering information, out of concern that those “consultations” would later be used to force Canada to commit resources in support of Britain’s “imperial adventures.” Reporting on a meeting of London-based high commissioners, Larkin even felt compelled to reassure King that “he had said nothing, but had merely listened.” The result, MacLaren tells us, was that “Canada largely disappeared from whatever presence it had on the immediate post-war imperial or even world stage, wallowing in much of the same unrealistic isolationism that had seized the United States.”
After 1935, when Vincent Massey was appointed to head Canada House, King had to contend with a much more assertive high commissioner. On duty throughout the war years, Massey always “tried to carry out [his] instructions with scrupulous care,” but he realized that troubled times called for a more forceful Canadian presence on London’s diplomatic scene. He thus endeavoured to “render Canada House into something that the prime minister certainly did not want: a post where the exchange of diplomatic and commercial information would be a daily occurrence, where Canada could benefit from unparalleled sources of information.” With hundreds of thousands of Canadian soldiers just about to fight a world war, such intelligence-gathering capabilities were of crucial importance. In spite of the fact that King’s continuing suspicion of British motives prevented Massey from achieving everything he hoped, he relentlessly pushed the envelope and thus ensured that, in the end, Canadian interests would receive the attention they deserved.
Roy MacLaren’s book is, no doubt, extremely valuable, but it also suffers from a number of flaws. The author divided it into 14 chapters, each one devoted to a different high commissioner, but there is no conclusion, and only a brief preface, to bring their different stories together. As a result, the book ends somewhat abruptly and leaves the reader with no clear sense of what thread, if any, unites all these different men. Furthermore, some of the last few chapters, especially those on Charles Ritchie and Lionel Chevrier, at less than 15 pages each, are much shorter than other sections and one is left with the impression that they were written in a bit of a rush. Although the narrative itself is exhaustive, it is also, at times, somewhat exhausting, meandering through the details of this policy debate or that public reaction to the appointment of a new high commissioner. Generally speaking, Commissions High would have been a better book, with a much wider appeal, had it been more closely edited.
But let this not deter anyone. MacLaren’s work is very much worth reading and those who wish to understand better how Canada moved out of the long shadow of imperial Britain and into the wider world, with a forceful and independent voice of its own, will find much food for thought in what, when all is said and done, is an important contribution to the history of Canadian diplomacy.
Martin Laflamme is a Canadian diplomat, currently posted to Tokyo. The views presented in the magazine are his own.