A Spy Story Well Told

Canada is fortunate to have on its international front line a diplomatic team of exceptional individuals: highly intelligent, well-educated men and women, devoted to their country and willing to live just about anywhere.

But diplomatic life, seen from the outside as full of glamour and excitement, usually is not. Despite the rounds of luncheons, cocktail parties, receptions and dinners that are written right into the job description, day to day is hard work, and pretty routine at that. Diplomats are responsible for identifying and getting to know people in the host country, not all of them interesting, who can be useful to Canada. They act as “passive” intelligence sources, passing back to Ottawa their observations on the political and economic state of play in their host country, often pretty dull but dutifully recorded. They shop visiting Canadian business people and cultural groups around. They get into hard bargaining on immigration and trade matters. They open their ears and close their mouths when sensitive security or military matters are discussed. Occasionally they host prime ministerial or ministerial official visits, and keep their fingers crossed that it is a career-making, and not a career-breaking, opportunity. James Bond would find diplomatic life pretty tedious.

Except. Except once in a while—not even once a career, but perhaps once an era—there comes into your normal everyday diplomatic life the mother of all adventures. That is what came to Kenneth Douglas Taylor, appointed Canada’s ambassador to Iran in 1977, shortly before the disintegration of the regime of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi: friend to the United States, bulwark against the communist Soviet Union directly to the north and cruel despot to his own people. Taylor, tall, good looking, extremely smart and not lacking in self-confidence, was just the right head of mission to have around as the world-changing Iranian Revolution was about to begin.

Taylor was until then a career trade commissioner when international trade belonged not to the Department of External Affairs and its striped pants set, but to the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, the “rough-and-tumble branch of the diplomatic service.” He was 43 years old and hungering after an ambassadorship: he was highly regarded in both departments, and thus his wish was enthusiastically granted. Taylor requested Iran because he believed it was “on the verge of becoming one of the world’s most exciting hot spots.” He could not have known how right he was.

Our Man in Tehran: Ken Taylor, the CIA and the Iran Hostage Crisis is the retelling of Taylor’s story that, in its rough outlines, is a well-known part of Canadian pride and mythology, particularly to the generation that watched and read about the riveting events at the time. How a group of Iranian student militants overran and occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran, holding 52 embassy employees hostage for 444 days before releasing them. How six Americans, born under luckier stars, eluded the occupiers and hid out for three months with the Canadian ambassador and another Canadian embassy employee before being successfully smuggled out of Iran and back to the U.S. on Canadian passports. How in frustration at his country’s impotence President Jimmy Carter was talked into authorizing a dramatic helicopter rescue of the hostages that not only failed but killed eight American would-be rescuers in the process. How Canada, and particularly Ken Taylor, played a pivotal role in assisting the American government with information and advice concerning the condition of the hostages along with providing care and protection for his six American “houseguests.”

Those are the bare bones of the story as they have been more or less accurately known for the past 30 years. What Our Man in Tehran tells us is that there is more to this story than we ever knew. Without saying so directly, it leads us to the conclusion that there is a direct line between the events of three decades ago and the aggressive anti-Americanism of Iranian leaders today.

The new information, available now as documents are declassified, fills out and authenticates the story of how the six Americans were able to evade capture due to the courage and ingenuity of Ken Taylor, his wife, Pat, his teenage son and his embassy team. They detail in dramatic fashion the step-by-step escape of the six under the noses of the Iranian authorities, until now unknown. And the book describes how, to their shame, diplomats from every other country abandoned their American colleagues to whatever fate awaited them. Only Taylor, with the support of Prime Minister Joe Clark and his secretary of state for external affairs, Flora MacDonald, was prepared to take risks on behalf of his American allies and friends, with some assistance at the margin from the Dutch and the New Zealanders.

Most significantly, and what has caused a mini-fuss among Canada’s chattering classes, is the revelation that Taylor was “the de facto CIA station chief” in Tehran once the U.S. embassy was occupied. A CIA agent code-named Bob was inserted into Canadian embassy property while he worked on plans for the release of the hostages from the U.S. embassy, rendered inaccessible to its own authorities. The chatterers have leapt to the conclusion that a Canadian (Taylor) was reporting directly to someone in Washington, who must have been calling all the shots on Canadian soil (which the embassy technically is). Faced with a diplomatic vacuum of its own, the U.S. State Department did rely heavily on Canadian support and assistance, and the support of Taylor in particular.

The book makes it very clear, however, that while a close working relationship developed very quickly between Taylor and the mysterious Bob, and was no doubt essential under the circumstances, Taylor continued to report to Ottawa in the normal way. Ottawa itself continued to act as the communicator with Washington, although the “normal channels” were busier than usual. What was out of the ordinary and only to be expected in such a sensitive matter was that the minister and prime minister were directly engaged. Taylor could not have operated without their explicit approval, but as the man on the spot he was regarded by his superiors as the main decision maker and retained veto power over details of the plan to whisk his so-called house guests out of the country. Washington, too, was more than willing to cede authority to the Canadian on the ground who became their main asset in an extremely tense and blessedly rare situation.

What is amusing about the early reception of the book is that no one talks about the book or its author: the chatter really is all about Ken Taylor and the CIA. Taylor is the man now doing the public speaking and the talk shows, not Robert Wright. Which is too bad. Wright is a historian, one of a very few who can draw the drama out of past events without sacrificing authenticity and integrity. He brings out the strong character and clear thinking not only of Taylor, but also of Joe Clark and Flora MacDonald, whose courageous contributions to the resolution of the crisis have, up until now, been undervalued. The author shines considerable light on a series of events that were pivotal in altering the relationship between the Islamic world and the rest, a relationship that continues to bedevil us. Wright is a historian, not an analyst, and he thankfully steers clear of attempting to preach or to reinterpret events in the light of what followed. But the policy analysts whose job it is to mine the riches of history for nuggets of wisdom will find much in this short book to ponder.